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Abstract 
Two opposite views can emerge when analyzing the Tunisian development experience. The 
first is a view of success and achievements, and the second is a view of a country facing many 
weaknesses and challenges. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the strategic factors 
regarding the development of Tunisia in the long run and to make an assessment of the needed 
reforms. After a structural adjustment period Tunisia has adhered to the Uruguay Agreements 
and accepted to belong to a Free Trade Area with the European Union (EU). Do these 
agreements bring new opportunities or more threats to its fragile agricultural and industrial 
activities? We will argue that the answer will depend on: I) the true willingness to adjust hence 
to accept the negative reactions and the costs generated by reforms, and 2) the ability to create 
the appropriate conditions for growth and to take advantage of dynamic effects. As to static 
effects, both the Uruguay and the FTA agreements do not seem in favor of Tunisia. Thus, 







I - INTRODUCTION 
Two opposite views can emerge when analyzing the Tunisian development 
experience. The first is a view of success and high performances and the second is a view 
of a country having to deal with a lot of challenges and weaknesses in the way of 
sustainable growth. 
Undoubtedly, during the last decades, since its independence (1956), Tunisia has achieved 
a lot of progress and growth. It was also able to implement ambitious reforms, especially 
when signs of unsustainability appeared, in the sixties and later in the mid-eighties. 
Today, it has to undertake deeper reforms in order to reach an even higher level of 
development. A more systematic modernization process and more appropriate policy 
choices are necessary, otherwise even regress would not be ruled out. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the factors that are strategic for the development 
of Tunisia in the long run. However, since the long run cannot be totally separated from 
short term policy choices, some attention ought to be paid to the link between recent and 
short term performances and possible future outcomes. The emphasis will however be 
put on the key strategic choices, mainly those regarding international relations and 
industrial policy. The ratification of the free trade Agreement (FTA) with the European 
Union (EU) is among the most important steps. Is it going to widely open for Tunisia the 
doors of the prosperous European market including modern technology and investments? 
Or is it going to be a threat to the fragile industries and agricultural activities that 
constitute the major part of its productive base? The economy has to become more robust 
and much more efficient. What is then to be done, given this new and more demanding 
environment? 
Before answering such a question, the first section will deal with the link between the 
past and the future and will give some insight and assessment of the potential for 
economic development and the willingness of Tunisia to adjust, that is to accept the 
sacrifice and the efforts that are required for progress. The second and third sections of 
the paper will be devoted first to the static and dynamic effects of the international 
agreements and of the liberalization process, second to the conditions of sustainable 
growth. 
II- THE WILLINGNESS TO ADJUST 
Information about past performances and the behavior of the main economic 
partners are significant for the identification and analysis of long term issues. In 
particular, they allow one to assess the willingness to undertake the needed adjustments 
and face the various negative reactions that characterize any reform period. 
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The results achieved in Tunisia leave room for an optimistic prediction but doubts are 
also important. 
1- The Optimistic View 
Optimistically, we can assert that, at least to a certain extent, the country's 
institutions and decision making mechanisms and the skills it already has allow for a 
smooth transition and integration within the new international environment. 
Among the success indicators, it is meaningful to note that per capita income has grown at 
an average rate of 3%, during more than three decades reaching, in 1995, a level which is 
five times the 1960 level, approximately $ US 18000 a year 
During the same period, life expectancy has increased sharply from 50 to 69 years, child 
mortality decreased, approximately, from 150% to 43%. 
In the field of education the number of schools and of students are incomparably higher 
today. Universal primary education enrollment, for boys and girls, is a fact and illiteracy 
has been largely reduced (35% in 1994 instead of 80% in 1960). 
Income distribution is relatively equitable (the Gini coefficient is nearly equal to the 
United Kingdom's 0.42). And an important middle class has actually emerged; it 
constitutes a reserve of skilled labor and under utilized entrepreneurship. It also includes a 
capable and often dedicated class of managers, both in the public and private sectors. All 
of these skills are to a large extent the outcome of public schooling and public health 
facilities and programs. 
This accumulation of human capital is obviously a major asset and a source of growth. It 
also means a substantial capacity to face challenges and to design and implement new 
plans. In other words, it means that Tunisia will be able to find its way. This point of 
view is partly supported by the outcomes of the stabilization and adjustment programs, 
adopted since 1987 and following the foreign payments deficit observed mainly in 1985- 
86. The implementation of these programs allowed the country to absorb, with a relative 
ease, the shocks and sacrifices imposed on it inspite of the external and exogenous 
disturbances that occurred, such as the Gulf war and the severe drought. It was possible 
to undertake successfully a comprehensive stabilization program including the restriction 
of consumption, investments, and the limitation of public expenditures and employment 
and the administration of a sharp depreciation of the Tunisian dinar. 
Moreover, structural reforms aiming at the establishment of an open export oriented 
economy had been implemented and some actions are still under way. They involve not 
only institutional transformation but also the management of conflicting interests and of 
social discontent. It is a liberalization process covering, as usual, international trade, 
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pricing, investment regulation, the fmancial market, the tax system and other major 
targets. 
The outcome of the stabilization and adjustment programs was a balance of payment 
recovery, a fast growth of exports (around 10%), and a high enough GDP growth rate 
(around 4.5%) even in periods of severe conditions. 
2 - The Negative Signs 
However, there are also negative signs. Liberalization was met by resistance from 
groups that are threatened with losses. Industries that used to be very protected put 
pressure to delay tariff reduction and most of all the removal of quantitative restrictions. 
The government itself had to take into account risks such as the fall in fiscal revenues and 
social unrest linked to the loss ofjobs (World Bank 94). 
The long tradition of price control and of imperfect competition in various markets makes 
price liberalization less effective. 
Reforms have been slow indeed in many fields with respect to trade liberalization, 
privatization and financial policies. Although the strategic options in favor of a market 
based and outward oriented economy does not seem seriously questioned, the situation is 
somehow ambiguous and attitudes are sometimes equivocal. 
For example, in the fields of international trade, including foreign payments, and regarding 
fmancial and capital markets, many reforms are delayed, some policy issues are not yet 
completely settled and some serious problems are far from being solved; these may even 
constitute major issues, for Tunisia, in the years to come. (Lahouel 1995 describes a wide 
range of examples in this regard.) 
The contradiction between intended actions and implementation reveals the existence of 
powerful pressure groups attempting to protect their interests. The point here is not to 
question interests but to emphasize the long run consequences of the concessions 
generated by this pressure. The speed and the extent of the reform process convey 
messages to economic actors and have an important impact on their expectations and 
therefore on their choices. This is crucial in particular for investors. 
Undoubtedly reform management is a hard and risky task and it happens that 
governments prefer, for short run considerations and because of political and social 
constraints, not to reveal the intended plan of action, nevertheless, the cost of the induced 
side effects may be too high. 
Too much caution and too many concessions, made in order to avoid confrontation, 
produce blurred signals and distorted expectations. Investors, for example, may then 
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delay their actions or misallocate resources. In Tunisia, for example, too much investment 
is being concentrated in tourism and not enough in manufacturing. 
The speed and sequencing of reforms themselves should therefore be more adequately 
planned and the strategic objectives should always be unambiguously stated and targeted. 
II. GROWTH CONDITIONS AND CHALLENGES 
Of course, the timing of the reforms and political economic issues may become 
minor if the planned reforms were not appropriate and the conditions for sustainable 
growth were not fulfilled. 
1 - The Challenge 
Tunisia made the commitment to liberalize its economy and become more market 
and export oriented since the first structural adjustment program it accepted in 1987 and 
later when it approved the Uruguay Round Agreement and the Free Trade Area (FTA) 
accord with the European Union, as part of a future scheme covering most of the Euro- 
Meditarranean region. Consequently, Tunisia has to abide by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules, to gradually dismantle its trade barriers and to adjust to the 
abolition of the Multifiber arrangements. 
It is to be noted, however, that Tunisia already had free access to most of the EU 
markets, except for agricultural commodities, which means that the Free Trade Agreement 
will basically lead to a unilateral elimination of trade barriers on the Tunisian side. Tunisia 
will have to grant free entry to all EU commodities, while it is not clear yet whether the 
Tunisian agricultural exports to the EU will ever be less restricted. So far Mediterranean 
agricultural products such as olive oil, citrus products, vegetables, wines are highly 
regulated under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
As to the Multifiber Arrangements, they used to protect countries like Tunisia from the 
much more competitive Asian and other newly emerging countries. Textiles represent a 
major export for Tunisia, mostly to the EU. Although the latter imposes quantitative 
restrictions on its textile imports the quotas that are assigned to Tunisia have not been 
restrictive. In other words Tunisia has practically free access to the EU for textiles and 
not much gain is to be expected from the FTA in terms of trade opportunities. In fact, it 
will have to face much stronger competition from countries like China, India, and 
Pakistan. 
It will indeed have to face major challenges. Net losses are not excluded in most 
calculations, unless dynamic effects are taken into account. 
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2 - Static and Dynamic Effects of Trade Liberalization 
a - Static Effects 
From a static point of view, Tunisia will hardly expect any gain. A large chunk of 
its agriculture and industry will simply be facing sharp competition from higher quality 
products from more efficient European and Asian rivals. Calculations (Boudhiaf 1995), 
(CEPEX 1994) tend to confirm that the net effects on trade flows will be detrimental for 
Tunisia and will cause job and welfare losses. The diversion effects will be too strong. 
This is a serious threat given that capital has been concentrated in a few vulnerable 
activities, the most vulnerable being those created and developed in a sheltered 
environment during the seventies. The degree of protection remains indeed quite high 
(Lahouel 1995) and, technologically, Tunisian industries remain very simple, requiring 
limited skills and yielding small value added. That is why Asian, and Central and East 
European countries, where skills are higher and/or wage cost lower, may dominate and 
leave little room in the market where Tunisia operates. 
The diversification issue is serious. Even when compared to other countries of the region, 
Tunisian exports are undiversified, most of them are traditional and declining, while too 
much is concentrated in textiles, garments and leather as far as manufacturing is concerned. 
Tourism, the major service activity, is also fragile and too sensitive to political shocks. As 
to exports of natural resources, petroleum is vanishing, phosphate is fluctuating and 
rarely profitable and agriculture is strongly contingent on climate. Hence, potential growth 
is mainly in manufacturing (table 2). 
Consequently, the negative effects should be dealt with mainly through the simultaneous 
reduction of tariffs towards other important trade partners and through the diversification 
of its manufacturing capacities. The diversification and development of new and 
profitable activities constitute an important issue, but static analysis cannot give a 
satisfactory answer to all the issues involved. 
b- Dynamic Effrcts and Strategic Actions 
Dynamic effects should be more substantial than static effects but are harder to 
evaluate and to identify. In fact, they are not automatic effects. Liberalization is not going 
to mechanically create the incentive to climb the technical progress ladder, to diversify 
production and exports and to reach higher quality and value added. Tunisian industrial 
goods had free entry to the UE and USA markets for a long time and yet not enough 
happened. 
In fact this situation is not so paradoxical. A closer observation of the production 
network and of the incentive scheme show that some prerequisites are not yet fully 
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available. The main sources of growth which are closely linked to the dynamic effects are 
problematic. 
We mean by dynamic effects the transformation and widening of production possibility 
sets generated by externalities and by the ability to benefit from economies of scale. 
Externalities and economies of scale are organically linked to human capital accumulation, 
(i.e. education, learning, research) , to innovations, to the efficient provision of services, 
especially in the field of conirnunication and information, and to the qualities of 
infrastructure and institutions (Grossman and Helpman 1992). All of these factors are 
fundamental to achieving competitiveness yet, in the case of Tunisia, a lot remains to be 
done regarding most of them. Firms are often too small and seldom used to innovative 
practices and international marketing. They often lack the skilled labor and prefer to 
operate with the simplest techniques. This is a stylized but accurate enough picture of the 
typical industrial firm. Outside the firm, the low quality of services and infrastructure 
cause a lot to yield high transaction costs. 
Therefore, if Tunisia is to achieve success within the international market (and there is no 
alternative), it has to lower its transaction costs and to plan for excellence and high 
quality. 
But such a challenge requires not only time but also massive investments, particularly in 
public goods and infrastructure. Most of all, profound reforms regarding institutions and 
incentives are required. 
Excellence should become the target, average performances may not allow survival 
anymore, especially in the industrial sector. Just in order to avoid regress, Tunisia ought 
to reach much higher quality (World Bank 1994) and performance. 
Such a transition puts the analysis again in the dynamic field. Let us look more closely at 
some of the above evoked factors which are essential for long term development: 
education, infrastructure, institutions... 
Education: 
Tunisia has achieved a great deal of progress in the educational field and more generally in 
the field of human capital development, as indicated above. However, the outcome is 
rather average (Nemat 1994), if we judge by the rate of enrollment in secondaiy and higher 
education, the rate of illiteracy or the type of skills that are inculcated (table3). 
Maybe the effort devoted to education relative to GDP was high and the country could 
not have afforded a bigger sacrifice. Nevertheless, the returns of the educational system 
were not high enough having been just average. The issue today is to spread education 
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much further, and more, so, to educate better. This being more in conformity with the 
needs of development (Berryman 1991). 
The allocation of resources among different levels and types of training remains a 
challenge for all countries. The optimal mechanisms seem hard to design, but, at least, 
there are obvious moves and adjustments that may be undertaken with low cost and high 
returns and that would lead to easier employment of skilled labor (since unemployment of 
skilled labor is a rising phenomenon). 
An action plan is required to induce a critical mass of technological research, and the 
acceleration of the learning process with the expected spillover effects. Some procedure, 
combining market and government activities, is to be instituted in order to establish 
prompt coordination and cooperation between educational institutions, businesses and 
government. 
The purpose being technical progress and hence competitiveness and growth, such an 
action plan may include as a major component the dissemination of work and business 
ethic, which constitute a basic ingredient for the improvement of the country's human 
resources and the resource allocation mechanisms. 
This qualitative long term transformation of behavior and attitudes would generate the 
driving force for the favorable effects and the transition to a really modern 
economy. 
Infrastructure and Services.: 
There is a need for increased investments and for better allocation of such investment 
among sectors and between public and private sectors. There is a particular need for more 
massive investments in infrastructure and services to increase the quality of telephones, 
transportation, access to various sources of information and information networks, where 
a lot remains to be done (table 4). This is the kind of investment that will create the right 
environment for genuine development, but it is also the kind that raises the most difficult 
financial and informational problems. 
Institutions and Incentives: 
Development also requires more efficient institutions and regulations. The institutional 
reform, which is most urgently needed, would be to modernize government agencies and 
institutions. Centralized, multiple, complex and yet ineffective controls, vague and 
contradictory procedures and laws often characterize the behavior of administrative 
services in all fields. It is a priority to address this issue and to look for efficiency in the 
public sector, for example, through the introduction of rational (often private-like) 
organization . Given that the public sector is not to completely disappear because it is 
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necessary for the provision of public goods and for the regulation of externalities, 
administrative reform is very important. 
The Environment: 
Efficient administrative services are needed, in particular for environmental protection. 
Environmental issues are key issues and still badly in need of effective government 
regulation. Even though Tunisia was among the first to adopt an official environmental 
strategy, environment degradation and neglect are real and awareness is limited. A serious 
gap between plans and implementation exists. This issue is of course linked to the 
management of natural resources. Water, the most determinant and constraining resource 
suffers the most from pollution (World Bank 1995 b). 
Tunisia is also rapidly depleting some of its key natural resources (which are in fact quite 
limited). It is already a net oil importer and it is expected to attain a much a higher oil 
deficit leading to a serious financial constraint. In approximately twenty years, Tunisia 
will probably have to import 90% of its oil consumption (around 20 million tons a year). 
Yet huge investment is needed elsewhere. Will savings, domestic and foreign, then be 
available? Again it will depend on the attractiveness of the overall environment and on the 
credibility of government plans. 
Credibility: 
Reform implementation and the emergence of dynamic effects depend on the existence of 
a national consensus and on the acceptance of the national strategic objectives by a wide 
majority, which does not exclude conflicts that are a fact of life. In real life, there are 
conflicting interests and most transformations create loosers and winners but stability 
may be reached through consensus. Otherwise there would be a credibility gap. In 
Tunisia, partners are yet to reach the needed consensus. Potential loosers resist 
liberalization. Rent seekers are still powerful and are not interested in the promotion of an 
efficient, transparent and more civilized society. 
This political economic issue is closely connected to that of democracy. The relationship 
between political stability, income distribution political freedom and the existence and the 
operation of democratic (or participate) institutions, and social values on the one hand 
and growth and development on the other hand, according to a recent analysis (Perotti 
82), tend to indicate positive correlation. From this point of view, Tunisian rating is 
among the best in the region but it is again rather average compared to highly performing 
countries. An attractive environment, for human and financial capital, requires more than 
an average rating. 
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CONCLUSION 
Therefore, a profound social transformation leading to higher productivity and 
generating the projected dynamic effects would be the result of more human capital 
accumulation, infrastructure, high quality services, a cleaner environment and more 
equitable and efficient institutions... 
These requirements may seem unreachable. In fact they characterize all developed 
countries and it is obvious that in a developing country they cannot be gathered 
instantaneously. The main thing is to start a cumulative and convergent process but this is 
again a task of successful governance. 
It is reasonable to conjecture that the creation of the FTA with the European Union and 
the whole liberalization program may well prompt such a modernization process which 
should lead to long term development. If the requirements are not fulfilled regress may be 
the alternative (sen 1993). 
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Table 1: Per Capita Income in Representative Countries 
Relative to Tunisia in 1992 
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Table 2: Export Earnings in Million Dinars 
(at 1990 prices) 
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Table 3: Education Illiteracy and Women Employment in Tunisia 
Compared to Some Selected Countries (%) 
SCHOOL Women 
Illiteracy 
Primary Secondary Tertiary Employed 
TUNISIA 95 42 9 35 25 
ALGERIA 88 60 12 43 10 
MOROCCO 66 28 tO 51 21 
TURKEY 99 51 15 19 34 
PORTUGAL 99 68 23 15 37 
FRANCE 100 100 43 40 
Source: World Bank "World Development Report 1994". 
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Table 4: General Infrastructure in Tunisia 
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